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Letter dated 30 January 2009 from the Secretary-General to the President of the Security Council

I refer to my letter of 19 December 2008 (S/2008/804), in which I proposed next steps on Somalia, including a package to support the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), and to assist in building the Somali security and rule-of-law institutions established under the Djibouti peace process. The Security Council approved those proposals in its resolution 1863 (2009), and requested an update, by 30 January 2009, on the precise equipment and services to be provided to AMISOM within the scope of the United Nations logistics capacity support package.

To meet that request, the Secretariat deployed an integrated technical assessment mission, led jointly by the United Nations Political Office for Somalia and the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, including a team of logistics specialists from the Department of Field Support. It visited Addis Ababa and Nairobi from 12 to 26 January 2009 to collect the necessary information and consult the Somali parties, the African Union (AU), AMISOM and other partners on the details of the support required by AMISOM and the Somali parties, as well as arrangements for the implementation of the proposals contained in my letter of 19 December. Although the technical assessment mission was unable to travel to Mogadishu owing to the security situation, it obtained valuable information from the AMISOM Force Commander, senior officials of the African Union, and Somali members of the Joint Security Committee who travelled to Nairobi to meet the mission, as well as representatives of donors supporting AMISOM. A full account of the findings and recommendations of the Mission will be provided to the Council in my forthcoming regular report on Somalia.

Overall, the assessment conducted by the technical assessment mission revealed that the level of support AMISOM has been receiving is very basic, with much of it falling below United Nations standards. In addition, AMISOM is highly dependent on donor funding, under complex arrangements which add a high degree of uncertainty to the planning efforts of the African Union.

AMISOM logistics support is currently predominantly delivered through a multifunctional logistics contract with a commercial contractor. While existing support arrangements are far from optimal, they represent the only lifeline of the Mission, and would need to be maintained in the short term. As I noted in my letter of 31 December 2008 to the President of the Security Council (S/2008/846), given the lead time needed to put in place appropriate support arrangements, the Organization may need to rely on the existing AMISOM logistics arrangements to

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ensure uninterrupted provision of logistics support. In parallel, efforts will be focused on the expedited establishment of more comprehensive support solutions to meet the needs of the full AMISOM deployment of 8,000 authorized troops. New support solutions under resolution 1863 (2009) will comply with United Nations standards. In addition, they will, where applicable and possible, be capable of rapid expansion to meet the needs of a full United Nations peacekeeping deployment, should one be authorized by the Council.

The Department of Field Support is identifying fast-track measures that will have an impact on the ground, prior to the implementation of more extensive support packages, in the areas of supply; engineering; medical support; movement support; aviation; communication and information technology, including public information; surface transport; and repair and maintenance.

One major challenge stems from the need to deliver this level of support within the standards of oversight traditionally associated with a United Nations peacekeeping operation of analogous size. Such a level of oversight calls for a United Nations international footprint on the ground in Somalia, which is at present precluded by the current security situation (phase V). This inherent contradiction must be resolved if we are to achieve our core objectives within the available oversight mechanisms.

It is to be noted that the logistics support package forms only one part of the assistance required to enable AMISOM to remain in place and build up its troop strength to its authorized level of 8,000 personnel. The annex to the present letter sets out the areas in which AMISOM would receive support from the United Nations logistics support package funded from assessed contributions, as well as needs that would have to be met from the envisaged trust fund or bilateral donor arrangements.

Subject to budgetary approval by the General Assembly in March 2009, the United Nations will begin to deliver quick wins and elements of logistical support through existing arrangements in the second quarter of 2009. However, it will take time for new arrangements to come on stream. It will be important to be realistic about the time required to bring existing contingents up to United Nations standards and to deliver the full logistics support package. In the interim, capability will continue to be dependent on strong bilateral assistance from Member States.

I would also recall the request by the Security Council to Member States to contribute to this endeavour through the trust fund and bilateral arrangements, as well as through contributions of personnel, equipment and other resources as detailed in paragraphs 8 and 14 of resolution 1863 (2009), as such support will be crucial to the success of this effort.

I should be grateful if you would bring the present letter and its annex to the attention of Members of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) **Ban** Ki-moon

Annex

Details of support to be provided to the African Union Mission in Somalia

1. In line with the letter of the Secretary-General of 19 December 2008 (S/2008/804) and Security Council resolution 1863 (2009), the technical assessment mission considered support to the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) through two expected channels: (a) provision of a logistics capacity support package, to be funded from United Nations assessed contributions and comprising the equipment and mission support services normally provided for a United Nations peacekeeping operation of the same size; (b) financial support from Member States through the envisaged United Nations trust fund, which will allow for funding to AMISOM to cover reimbursements and, eventually, to help procure necessary contingent equipment. In addition, the technical assessment mission identified a number of critical needs for military capability that cannot be met through United Nations assistance but would need to be met through force generation by the African Union, with support from donors that have the required capability.

2. Logistical support to AMISOM was considered in the functional areas of supply (rations, fuel and general supply); engineering, including construction, power generation and water supply; medical support; aviation; transportation, including the provision of protected mobility (armoured personnel carriers); strategic movement support; equipment repair and maintenance; strategic and tactical communications; and information technology support. Key findings of the technical assessment mission were as follows:

(a) Supply. All required fuel, oils, lubricants and rations are supplied to AMISOM under a bilateral arrangement through a contract with a commercial company providing a multifunctional logistics contract. Some of these commodities are provided by subcontractors in Mogadishu; others are supplied by local contractors outside Somalia and are flown by a strategic air bridge from Entebbe to Mogadishu. AMISOM does not hold significant reserve stocks in Mogadishu. Contingents are also short of general supply items. In the short term, strategic stock levels must be built up in Mogadishu in order to improve the robustness and survivability of the force. In time, contracts for fuels and rations to United Nations standards will be established. Essential general supply items, including personal protection items and defence stores required by AMISOM troops and police to fill immediate needs, can be drawn from United Nations strategic deployment stocks or procured through United Nations contracts.

(b) Engineering. All required support for AMISOM troop deployment is currently provided under a bilateral arrangement through the commercial company providing the multifunctional logistics contract. The overall conditions in theatre are well below United Nations standards, particularly in the areas of accommodation, sanitation and the quality and quantity of potable water. There is an urgent need to provide and/or upgrade key facilities. At the request of the African Union (AU), the United Nations Office for Project Services has developed a plan for AMISOM headquarters and a level II hospital. With regard to other support services, there is no immediate alternative to continuing to draw support from the commercial company providing the multifunctional logistics contract to improve the sanitation, power and water production capacity at existing camps, pending the acquisition and

development of infrastructure at new locations to rehouse existing contingents and provide additional facilities for planned contingent deployments. As the support evolves, United Nations contracts will need to be established for the provision of hard-wall accommodation and significant infrastructure improvements.

(c) Medical support. Existing AMISOM medical support consists of one level I medical facility and elements of a level II hospital. Out of area MEDEVAC/CASEVAC services are provided under the contract held with the commercial company providing the multifunctional logistics support; however, they are available only during daylight hours, as Mogadishu airport has no night capability. Therefore, immediate action is required to provide United Nations standard medical services up to level II. The equipment, pharmaceuticals, consumables and laboratory supplies required, including ambulances, can be met from strategic deployment stocks. However, appropriately qualified medical personnel to staff the facilities must be provided by the participating contingents.

(d) Movement support. AMISOM relies on partner support for cargo transport, deployment and rotation of contingent personnel, and expects these arrangements to continue through current planned deployments of the additional battalions from Uganda, Burundi and Nigeria. Significant capability and capacity enhancements to the current movement support by air and sea are required to provide airfield and port services for cargo handling, as well as cargo handling equipment, storage and surface transport services. These should be covered under the United Nations logistics package.

(e) Aviation. Current air operations are performed by the commercial company providing the multifunctional logistics contract, using subcontracted commercial operators. These operations are not performed to United Nations aviation standards or International Civil Aviation Organization standards. There is an urgent need for the United Nations to provide a small jet aircraft, probably based initially in Nairobi but able to fly into Mogadishu, in order to improve the capacity for medical evacuation for AMISOM. Such an aircraft could also be used to support the activities of the United Nations Political Office for Somalia and the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for the Great Lakes Region. Mogadishu airport is large, with considerable capacity for expanded operations. But there is an immediate requirement for equipment and infrastructure development of the airport to allow for greater operational safety, including the provision of a night operation capacity, an aviation fuel supply system, search-and-rescue operations, firefighting and emergency crash and rescue services. This should be covered under the United Nations package.

(f) Communications and information technology. AMISOM has a limited existing tactical communications capacity using conventional VHF/HF radio equipment. There is a critical and immediate need for strategic communications and information technology capability. The option of providing strategic deployment stocks to meet all aspects of that requirement is available. Installation, training of contingents and technical support in theatre may be provided through local contracts.

(g) Public information. AMISOM has no FM radio broadcast capability, a vital and preliminary component of the Mission's proposed information operations plan. To meet that urgent need on a temporary basis, a MDTS-broadcast package will be transferred from existing stocks at the United Nations Logistics Base at

Brindisi, Italy, to Entebbe, where it will be staged for forward deployment to Mogadishu. Staffing should be provided through a contracted consultant, who would support personnel from the countries contributing troops to AMISOM.

(h) Surface transport. AMISOM infantry battalions currently possess limited armoured personnel carriers and urgently need to be brought up to United Nations standards to increase their security, operational effectiveness and ability to move casualties under armoured protection. Some equipment shortfalls are being addressed under bilateral agreements, and further armoured personnel carriers will be provided as part of the AMISOM support package. There is also an immediate need for force-level vehicles in the areas of airfield support, engineering and material handling equipment. Such United Nations-owned equipment can be operated by contingents and local operators and will be needed to improve current facilities and prepare sites for planned deployments of additional contingents.

(i) Repair and maintenance. Under current memorandum-of-understanding arrangements with AU, deployed AMISOM troop-contributing countries are responsible for maintaining all major equipment to a serviceability level determined and agreed to by both parties. However, there is a need for operations and maintenance services to be enhanced and for a wider range of maintenance and operations support within the Mission, both for contingent- and United Nations-owned equipment, as well as basic training on maintenance of different types of transport vehicles. In the medium to long term, plans will be developed to ensure the serviceability of the Mission's transport assets. This will be covered under the United Nations logistics package.

3. To support planning and delivery of the logistics support package, and as directed by the Security Council in its resolution 1863 (2009), the Department of Field Support intends to establish a dedicated and independent field support headquarters. The headquarters should be located in Nairobi (with the option of establishing efficiencies in shared support services to the United Nations Political Office for Somalia). As soon as security conditions permit, it will establish an element forward in Mogadishu to act as an interface with AMISOM headquarters and to ensure delivery of support, including that provided by commercial contractors. It will also have an element in Addis Ababa to liaise at the strategic level with AU and to replace the logistics planning capability currently provided by United Nations planners in the AU Strategic Planning and Management Unit. Other specialist planners (military, police, humanitarian, medical and others, including in the area of disarmament, demobilization and reintegration), would continue to assist the AU Strategic Planning Management Unit, as requested in resolution 1863 (2009). The establishment of an independent Mission support headquarters responsible to the Department of Field Support will ensure clear accountability for the delivery of support to all clients. It will also facilitate planning for and migration to a full United Nations peacekeeping operation, if mandated by the Security Council in due course.

4. The proposed trust fund will be utilized to meet the costs incurred by troop- and police-contributing countries in providing contingents for deployment. These costs could include the provision of contingent equipment, such as uniforms, light vehicles, armoured personnel carriers and tentage, and the payment of salaries and allowances to deployed personnel.

5. In addition to the logistics support package and monies delivered through the trust fund, AMISOM will also have a number of military capability needs to achieve the new tasks required by the Djibouti Peace Agreement, protect its forces and provide better security for air and sea operations. These will need to be supplied either by countries contributing troops to the African Union or through bilateral support. The following critical needs have been identified by the technical assessment mission:

(a) Combat engineering. As the threat of indirect fire is high, AMISOM must have the capability to improve its force protection measures, including through the construction of bunkers and vehicle checkpoints and the strengthening of key points. Contracted equipment solutions could be used to support defensive and other construction tasks, including the building of bunkers, gates and fences, and to improve facilities and infrastructure. Integral combat engineering capability should be provided by troop-contributing countries; however, should this not prove to be adequate, additional support could be provided through a commercial contract.

(b) Counter-IED and explosive ordnance disposal capability. AMISOM faces significant risks from all forms of improvised explosive devices (IEDs), including remote-controlled devices, command detonated mines and suicide bombers. The technical assessment mission found that high-technology anti-IED devices, which are easily damaged or countered, are not a good solution to the problem. The most practical solution would be training on patrolling techniques and tactics; this could be provided to AMISOM by qualified Member States. In addition, a trained explosive ordnance disposal team will be required. Again, this is best provided bilaterally to a troop-contributing country from another Member State.

(c) Inshore maritime capability. Protecting air and sea lines of supply will become an increasingly critical task for AMISOM as additional battalions deploy and to support the envisaged logistics package. The technical assessment mission found that that task would require a minimum of six craft, which should be able to travel at 25 knots and operate in rough sea and weather conditions (except storms). Armed, low-technology vessels with a communications suite would be suitable; such craft could be operated by existing troops with minimal training, but would require support from a professional naval officer who could be seconded to AMISOM as a liaison officer. The additional inshore craft, maintenance and training could be provided by a contractor, if not available from a troop-contributing country.

(d) Offshore maritime capability (maritime task force). Delivery of the United Nations support package to AMISOM and to any subsequent United Nations peacekeeping operation will require extensive use of commercial shipping into and out of Mogadishu and, possibly, in due course, other Somali ports. In order to ensure safe passage for such shipping, the United Nations will require guaranteed naval escorts. This would ideally be provided by a dedicated maritime force provided by a troop-contributing country or through a formal arrangement with one of the existing maritime forces in the area. Without adequate naval support, it will be impossible for the United Nations logistics package to be delivered.

Legal and contractual issues

6. The United Nations support programme will be defined and provided through a range of contractual instruments. Host Government agreements need to be established to allow the United Nations and its contractors to operate in respective countries. A memorandum of understanding between the United Nations and AU/AMISOM is required to define the responsibilities and obligations of each party. On the commercial side, the United Nations will seek authority initially to absorb existing arrangements for AMISOM troop support provided by donors, and formalize arrangements with the United Nations Office for Project Services for the mission headquarters and hospital construction. A range of additional support services will be required as soon as possible. As the United Nations analysis of contingent and future United Nations support conditions develop, it is anticipated that other services will be identified. In parallel, scopes of work for longer-term requirements to bring support services to United Nations standards will be developed and bid commercially. In view of the prevailing conditions in Mogadishu, which prevent United Nations staff from participating in daily in-theatre activities, it must be recognized that flexibility will be required in procuring, administering and verifying services provided by contractors.

Funding arrangements

7. With the agreement of the General Assembly, a proposal will be submitted to it for initial funding requirements to provide the United Nations logistical support package to AMISOM in line with the Security Council resolution. The logistical support will cover the military and police components of AMISOM. In this regard, logistics support for the Mission's full deployment and sustainment will be a substantial undertaking. Overall costs and staffing would be similar to that for an equivalent United Nations peacekeeping mission, but, uniquely it would be funded separately through United Nations funding (for logistics support) and a United Nations-administered trust fund of voluntary contributions (for AMISOM personnel and contingent equipment).

8. United Nations-assessed funding will be utilized to meet the life support needs of the deployed AMISOM force. This will include payment for rations, fuel and additional engineering works and improved aviation, communications and medical support. Assessed funding will also be used to pay for the strategic deployment of new forces, the rotation of existing forces, the movement of equipment and supplies and additional staff to manage the delivery of the package.

9. Costs for the logistics support package remain dependent on ongoing work to identify suppliers and deliver support solutions. However, the package could require a significant allotment of United Nations-assessed funding in addition to the trust fund in order to meet set-up costs and a year of full AMISOM operations based on comparable missions of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations

10. The proposed trust fund will be utilized to meet the costs incurred by troop- and police-contributing countries in providing contingents for deployment. Those costs could include the provision of contingent equipment, such as uniforms, light vehicles, armoured personnel carriers and tentage, and the payment of salaries and allowances to deployed personnel.

Delivery timelines

11. Subject to budgetary approval by the General Assembly in March, the United Nations will begin to deliver quick wins and elements of logistical support through existing arrangements in the second quarter of 2009. However, it will take time for new arrangements to come on stream. It will be important to be realistic about the time required to bring existing contingents up to United Nations standards and to deliver the full logistics support package. In the interim, capability will continue to be dependent on strong bilateral assistance from Member States.